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JUSTICE GORSUCH’S PATENT 
OPINIONS, THE PTAB, AND 
ANTAGONISM TOWARD THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
DANIEL D. KIM AND JONATHAN STROUD* 
ABSTRACT 
In his first term, Justice Neil Gorsuch has made a surprisingly forceful 
impact on, of all things, patent law—and even more unlikely, the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office’s adjudicatory arm, the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board. Was there any way to predict, from his 10th Circuit 
opinions below, that he would author opinions in all three patent cases in 
his first term? Was this attention the result of deeply submerged but long-
felt opinions on patent law, or rather a result of his sharp distrust of 
administrative overreach? We analyze 10th Circuit and Supreme Court 
opinions authored by Justice Gorsuch, and conclude his unforeseen 
interest springs from his desire to limit agency power rather than from any 
particular concern with patents. Still, his opinions—intentionally or by 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The real art of conversation is not only to say the right thing at the right place, 
but to leave unsaid the wrong thing at the tempting moment.”  
Lady Dorothy Nevill 
Justice Gorsuch cares deeply about patents. At least, that is the conclusion 
many would have you draw1 from his penning of opinions in all three of the patent 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices reject Patent and Trademark Office’s rules 
for partial consideration of petitions for inter partes review, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 25, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/opinion-analysis-justices-reject-patent-and-trademark-offices-
rules-for-partial-consideration-of-petitions-for-inter-partes-review/; Jenny B. Martin, Justice Gorsuch 
Drives Home Patent Protection, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2017/dec/6/justice-neil-gorsuch-patent-protection/. 
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cases before the high court his first term (2017–2018).2 They would urge you to 
read the tea leaves, make some inferences, and come to understand that Justice 
Gorsuch has long harbored strong opinions on patents.3 But is there any evidence, 
hint, or suggestion in his life, work, or past opinions that Gorsuch the jurist was 
ever particularly interested in patents per se?4 Or is it rather that the patent disputes 
of the modern Court almost invariably contain Federal administrative law 
aspects—something he cares deeply about—and provide a convenient battleground 
from which to express his open and growing skepticism of the Federal 
Government’s ability to handle legal disputes?5 Despite the many voices making 
the former claim, it does not appear that Justice Gorsuch cared (or even thought) 
much about patent law before his elevation to the high court.6 
After reviewing Justice Gorsuch’s IP-related opinions 7 —none of them 
squarely patent cases—a few subtle points emerge. The most prominent appears to 
be that Justice Gorsuch’s opinions, in general, spring from deep desire to check the 
administrative state—in sum, it is not about patents, it is about administrative law 
and the balance of powers. On that point, the liberal justices—in particular, Justice 
Elena Kagan—sit on the opposite end of the spectrum.8 And his recent selection of 
 
 2. See Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 (2018); WesternGeco 
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 3. See infra Section III. 
 4. We are not alone in asking. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Justice Neil Gorsuch, PATENTLY-O 
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/04/justice-neil-gorsuch.html (“I expect Justice 
Gorsuch to support strong patent rights, but primarily focus on statutory language and historic 
precedent. I.e., do not expect Gorsuch to see patents as a fundamental right, but rather a policy tool that 
can be fully regulated by Congress.”); Howard S. Hogan & Lucas C. Townsend, Where Does Judge 
Gorsuch Fall on IP?, LAW J. NEWSL. (Mar. 1, 2017), 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/03/01/where-does-judge-
gorsuch-fall-on-ip/?slreturn=20180726155851; Scott Graham, What to Expect From Neil Gorsuch on 
IP, Patents and Trade Secrets, THE NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 13, 2017) 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202779049527/What-to-Expect-From-Neil-Gorsuch-
on-IP-Patents-and-Trade-Secrets/ (discussing many of the same few non-patent IP-related 10th Circuit 
cases discussed herein). 
 5. Or maybe it is just that, as the junior Justice on the Court, Justice Gorsuch is being given the 
least-desired or lowest-priority opinions to write. 
 6. In an irrelevant but colorful aside, the United States Patent and Trademark Rocky Mountain 
Regional Office in Denver, on the 10th floor of the GSA building, literally looks down on the 10th 
Circuit, Justice Gorsuch’s onetime seat. It is fair to assume that he was at least familiar with the creation 
of the regional Office and its proximity to his Court in the years prior to his ascension. What he thought 
about that—if at all—is, of course, as enigmatic as his earlier views on patents, if any.  
 7. See infra Section III.  
 8. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2000) 
(advocating for a broader view of presidential executive and administrative power).  
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two patent-experienced law clerks only reinforces the observation that this interest 
is newfound, and seemingly provoked by his seat on the High Court.
9
  
In sum, looking at Justice Gorsuch’s opinions can help inform his reasoning, 
worldview, and goals as they relate to the state of U.S. patent law. We begin by 
introducing a short biographical background, continue by reviewing some key 10th 
Circuit cases, look to four important first-term Supreme Court cases, and briefly 
conclude. 
II. BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Nothing in Justice Gorsuch’s lightly reported background and upbringing 
suggests he would have any particular interest or expertise in patent law. 
Nonetheless, context is important (and interesting) considering how little the 
average lawyer knows about his Honor. 
Neil McGill Gorsuch was born in 1967 to two lawyers, Anne and David 
Gorsuch.10 His mother Anne was named the first female Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) Administrator in 1981, though she resigned under pressure 22 
months later after refusing to turn over subpoenaed documents. 11  Shortly 
thereafter, his parents divorced.12 
 
9. He has hired Notre Dame Professor Stephen Yelderman, a professor of patent law and a 
former 10th Circuit Clerk, for the 2019–2020 season, as well as Jeff Quilici, a former K&L Gates LLP 
and Baker Botts LLP patent litigator and another 10th Circuit Clerk of then-Judge Gorsuch’s. See Kevin 
Allen, Professor Stephen Yelderman to clerk for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, NOTRE DAME 
LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 15, 2018), https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/professor-stephen-yelderman-to-
clerk-for-supreme-court-justice-neil-gorsuch/; IAM, Amplified Patent Expertise Could Help SCOTUS 
Dispel Credibility Rumors, (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/justice-gorsuch-
makes-his-patent-voice-heard-he-has-unusual-amount-ip-expertise-call. He has also hired what appears 
to be the first Native American Supreme Court Law Clerk, Tobi Young, who is currently serving in the 
2018–2019 term. See Press Release, Chicksaw Nation Media Relations Office, Chicksaw Woman 
Selected To Clerk For Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://chickasaw.net/News/Press-Releases/Release/Chickasaw-woman-selected-to-clerk-for-Supreme-
Cour-47329.aspx. While her heritage does not reflect any special expertise in patent law or tribal 
sovereign immunity law, it is at least further evidence of his longstanding relationship and expertise in 
areas of tribal concern. See id. (“Justice Gorsuch is well respected by tribal leaders for his 
understanding of tribal sovereignty and Indian law. His decision to select a Native American to serve as 
clerk underscores his appreciation of the importance of the Native perspective on Indian law.”).  
 10. Neil Gorsuch, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/neil-gorsuch-020617 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
 11. Burford Resigns as Administrator of Embattled EPA, TOLEDO BLADE, Mar. 10, 1983, at 1. It 
is unclear how many and how much of Gorsuch’s opinions concerning the administrative state were 
formed during his “formative” years; however, it is difficult to image that this particular scandal helped 
improve the young Neil Gorsuch’s early opinions of the propriety of the exercise of administrative 
power.  
 12. Patricia Sullivan,  Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies; Reagan EPA Director, WASH. POST, July 
22, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3418-2004Jul21.html. 
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Justice Gorsuch attended Georgetown Preparatory School in Maryland, 
where he was voted class president. 13  At Columbia University, he displayed 
conservative views as a writer for the Columbia Daily Spectator and co-founder of 
The Federalist Paper.14 He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1988. Gorsuch attended 
Harvard Law School, where he was classmate with Barack Obama, earning his 
J.D. in 1991.15 
Neil Gorsuch first clerked for Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.16 He then spent another year 
clerking with two Supreme Court justices, the retired Anthony M. Kennedy and the 
retired Byron R. White.17 
In 1995, Gorsuch joined the D.C. law firm formerly known as Kellogg, 
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel.18 Specializing in complex litigation across a 
wide range of fields, including antitrust, telecommunications, and securities fraud, 
he made partner in three years, in 1998.19  It is unclear if he handled or was 
exposed in his years in private practice to any patent-specific matters. 
In 2004, Gorsuch received a doctorate in legal philosophy from the 
University of Oxford.20 He then joined the U.S. Department of Justice in 2005 as 
principal deputy associate attorney general, helping to oversee areas related to 
constitutional law, civil rights, and environmental regulation.21 In his own words, 
“as Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General at the Department of Justice, I 
had a supervisory role over litigating components that were involved in various 
kinds of intellectual property litigation.” 22  But nowhere does it suggest he 
managed or was exposed to patent law in particular—and the answer is likely no in 
any real respect, unless in regards to his antitrust background, which seems 
unlikely given his focus there. 
In July 2006, the 39-year-old Gorsuch was confirmed without opposition to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Denver.23 That year he also 
 
 13. Neil Gorsuch, supra note 10. 
 14. Id. (showing his early tendency towards a more conservative interpretation of the law). 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. (The firm is now known as Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick LLP).  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., NOMINATION OF JUDGE NEIL M. GORSUCH TO BE ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gorsuch%20QFR%20Responses.pdf [hereinafter 
“NOMINATION OF JUDGE GORSUCH”]. 
 23. Neil Gorsuch, supra note 10. 
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published a book version of his Doctoral Thesis, The Future of Assisted Suicide 
and Euthanasia, in which he argued against the legality of the practice.24 
He later established himself, through statements and his judicial opinions, as 
a sort of neo-originalist and a textualist,25 adhering to a belief in the intent of the 
founders of the U.S. Constitution, though some have argued his “natural law” 
philosophy is more radical than Justice Scalia’s style of Constitutional 
originalism.26 He has supported religious freedom in important and controversial 
cases—for example, ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby in 2013 during the store’s 
fight against mandated contraception coverage in the Affordable Care Act.27 
Gorsuch also made known his opposition to the power given to federal 
regulators over courts, invoking the controversial 1984 ruling that set the legal 
precedent in that matter during a 2016 immigration case.28 He was nominated by 
President Donald J. Trump to fill the seat vacated by the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia after a lengthy Congressional battle involving President Barak Obama’s 
attempt to appoint Merrick Garland for the same seat.29 He was confirmed, 54–
45,30 and sat for the 2017–2018 term, the first and only justice to sit with his once-
clerked-for Justice, Anthony Kennedy, before the latter’s retirement at the end of 
the term.31 
 
 24. NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2006) (adapted from Neil Gorsuch, The right to receive assistance in suicide and euthanasia, 




 25. See Rachel del Guidice, Gorsuch Touts Originalism, Textualism in Address to Conservative 
Legal Society, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/11/17/gorsuch-
touts-originalism-textualism-in-address-to-conservative-legal-society/ (stating that “[a] person can be 
both a committed originalist and textualist and be confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States”).  
 26. See J. Paul Kelleher, Neil Gorsuch’s “natural law” philosophy is a long way from Justice 
Scalia’s originalism, VOX (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/3/20/14976926/gorsuch-natural-law-supreme-court-hearings. 
 27. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (finding the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate on a private 
business violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), aff’d sub nom Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
 28. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 29. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed to Supreme Court After Senate Uses ‘Nuclear 
Option’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/neil-gorsuch-
confirmed-supreme-court-after-senate-uses-nuclear-option-n743766. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-supreme-court.html. 
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III. 10TH CIRCUIT OPINIONS 
“Our age is infected with a mania for shewing things only in the environment that 
properly belongs to them, thereby suppressing the essential thing, the act of the 
mind which isolated them from that environment.”32 
In his ten years on the 10th Circuit, Justice Gorsuch authored few published 
IP-related opinions—likely due to a combination of geography and jurisdiction. 
According to Justice Gorsuch, the 10th Circuit, per statute,33 did not hear any but 
the most tangential patent-related appeals;34 unsurprising, given the statute and that 
the 10th Circuit covers an area of the country that does not include many large 
cities, innovative centers, or large universities with busy tech transfer offices. It is 
perhaps unsurprising then that diligent searching revealed only a handful of even 
IP-relevant, much less patent-centric, opinions. 
Unfortunately, Judge Gorsuch’s 10th Circuit opinions, after research and 
review, do not reveal much about patent law in general or how he is likely to 
consider appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), but they do 
reveal important things about his jurisprudence in general, as well as in areas of 
adjacent law sure to arise in the patent context in the coming years—Native 
American tribal sovereign immunity and Federal Article III standing to challenge 
administrative decision-making. We briefly review a representative sample of his 
10th Circuit opinions, addressing issues particular to recent patent issues, like the 
sovereign immunity of Native American tribes. 
For context, the sovereign immunity of Native American tribal patent owners 
came to a head recently in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals 
Inc.,
35
 a case likely to result in a brief for certiorari—thus, understanding Justice 
Gorsuch’s approach to tribal immunity below could provide context for any future 
rulings from the bench, either on certiorari or in opinion. 
Luckily for those seeking that context, the 10th Circuit (and Justice Gorsuch) 
is no stranger to Native American issues, including those of sovereign immunity. 
Indeed, you can trace a direct line from Hydro Resources Inc. v. U.S. EPA,36 a 6–5 
en banc decision over Native American land rights, to Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
 
 32. MARCEL PROUST, WITHIN A BUDDING GROVE 328 (C.K. Scott Moncrieff trans., 1st. ed. 1919). 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 grants jurisdiction to all appeals from cases “arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents” See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
 34. See NOMINATION OF JUDGE GORSUCH, supra note 22 (“As a [Tenth Circuit] judge, I have 
participated in intellectual property cases, though of course not patent cases which, as you note, proceed 
to another circuit.”). 
 35. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 2018-1638 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2018). 
 36. Hydro Resources Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 
60 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 18:1 
 
v. Lundgren,37 a 7–2 late-term Supreme Court case in which he sided with the 
liberal Justices, and drew a disagreeable concurrence from Chief Justice Roberts, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, and a truly biting dissent from Justice Thomas, joined 
by Justice Alito. This will be discussed later.38 
After reading his handful of previous 10th Circuit opinions on IP disputes, 
such as copyrights, trade secrets, and patent-adjacent standing disputes, other 
nuances emerge.39 Gorsuch can be pithy. He can be biting. He can be folksy (if 
sometimes forcedly so). He clearly knows the law, and seems to favor citing rules 
over records. He will summarily dismiss arguments he finds irrelevant or meritless 
as seemingly beneath notice. His gloss of facts—refreshing to one used to reading 
citation-heavy administrative proceedings—suffices only to inform the reader of 
their various truths, and are structured and stated to lead readers down his planned 
primrose path. His opinions read like a law professor’s dream in terms of clarity 
and structure. He is not often verbose. He is a smart, possibly impatient man who 
would like to get the point across neatly. 
In his first term, Justice Gorsuch has taken a harder line than even some 
supporters would have likely supposed. He seems less concerned with consensus 
or majority-building than with statement-making, and has even raised the ire of 
other conservative justices, as can be seen in his 8–1 dissent in Sveen v. Melin40 or 
in the dissent of Justice Thomas in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.41 
For all of that, you can count us both admirers, 42  if not of his judicial 
philosophy—and here we admit biases43—then at least of his obvious ability as a 
writer and jurist.44 
 
 37. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1655–57 (2018). 
 38. See infra Section III.A.  
 39. There has been quite a bit of discussion about the stylistic differences between Judge Gorsuch 
of the 10th Circuit and Justice Gorsuch of the Supreme Court and the difference in quality between the 
two styles. See, e.g., Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative Guide to Neil Gorsuch’s 
Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (2018). As the vast majority of his writing stems from his 10th 
Circuit tenure, we have formed our opinions reviewing the entirety of his work as a jurist, and not just 
his limited tenure as a Justice. Thus, despite some recently noticed errors of redundancy and heavy-
handed prose, we will continue to write in the present tense about Justice Gorsuch’s literary style.  
 40. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1826–31 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 41. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. at 1656 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42. We, the authors, do not admit to sharing a single hive-mind, nor do we completely mirror in 
our opinions in all things. However, we do believe in the importance of compromise, discussion, and 
debate. We understand that we can accomplish more as a unit than as individuals: to wit, “two heads are 
better than one.” Thus, for this article, we are we. 
 43. We identify with a more liberal judicial philosophy, though we strive to keep an open mind 
and to evolve. Both authors were educated at American University’s Washington College of Law—
well-known for its liberal tendencies—but we seek to maintain a healthy respect and awareness of 
alternative views. (One of the authors is often better at this than the other.) We have found the recent 
debate over the scope of patent law’s administrative aspects both unexpected and fascinating, coming as 
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Justice Gorsuch greatly prefers to apply the filial “we” in his opinions, 
inviting the readers close with familiarity and witticism, as if welcoming the reader 
into the court’s mind—“[w]hile we do not imagine,” “we are able to limit our 
attention in this case,” “we thus understand,” or while, writing as the Court, “we 
have no difficulty” determining something, while “[p]laintiffs do not argue, and we 
do not remotely hold,” otherwise.45 Give him credit—he endeavors to spice up the 
page. He might add that the “[d]efendants, unsurprisingly, disagree,” but that “[a]s 
it happens, we are able to avoid entering this thicket.”46 Other courts may “remind 
us” or a party’s arguments may “not tell the whole story.” 47  A case may be 
“[i]nformative in its contrast,” or, of a certain dispute, “we have no need to pick 
sides today.”48 
Or this gem, from a determination of personal jurisdiction in a copyright 
case: “In this way, [the inquiry] is something like a bank shot in basketball. A 
player who shoots the ball off of the backboard intends to hit the backboard, but he 
does so in service of his further intention of putting the ball into the basket;” thus, 
a defendant’s “express aim” could “be said to have reached into [the court’s 
jurisdiction] in much the same way that a basketball player’s express aim in 
shooting off of the backboard is not simply to hit the backboard, but to make a 
basket.49 
With that overview on style and background, we turn to the cases—the only 
notable published writings related to intellectual property we could identify for this 
article. 
A. Hydro Resources Inc. v. EPA 
Hydro is relevant and important on a few levels—those of standing, 
administrative skepticism, rules challenges, and Justice Gorsuch’s ability to gain a 
majority of his colleagues’ support. As an en banc decision he authored, it was 
likely the product of time and effort, and can provide an important window into his 
 
it has recently from many some conservative parties who once saw the AIA and other patent reforms as 
an extension of the kinds of tort reform of the 90s as supporting American businesses.  
 44. See supra note 39 for further discussion. 
 45. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071–72 & 1074 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 46. Id. at 1072–73.  
 47. Id. at 1075. 
 48. Id. at 1076 & 1079 (ruling for the originally pro se small challenger against the corporate 
owner of copyrights on a personal jurisdiction). 
 49. Id.  
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approach to standing, which recently emerged as a hot-button issue in the context 
of appeals from the PTAB.50 
In Hydro and other cases, then-judge Gorsuch took a somewhat liberal view 
of standing, allowing a bare challenge to an EPA rule by a company who had not 
demonstrated more than that it would have to obtain a second permit and endure 
the additional expense of, in the future, complying with further regulatory fees.51 
This has relevance to his view of potential future challengers to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) administrative rules, in that it suggests 
he is likely to find standing is no great hurdle to such a challenge. 
He unsurprisingly sided with the state regulatory body over the EPA’s 
expansive reading of its permitting jurisdiction, even though it was the EPA’s 
original choice to devolve some of its regulatory authority to state agents—and in 
doing so, sided with the regulated over the regulator.52 The complex issue earned 
him a majority, though a close one, of his 10th Circuit colleagues, and a biting 
dissent from the rest.53 
Judge Gorsuch also addressed, at some level, his wariness of agency 
deference in Hydro,54  giving us a window into how he might treat deference 
arguments on appeal. Though his view on deference was not as obvious then as it 
has been,55 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion follows the legacy of his Supreme Court 
predecessor, Justice Scalia.56 Though the primary dissent argued that the EPA 
deserved at least Skidmore deference,57 then-Judge Gorsuch reasoned that it is 
 
 50. See Matthew J. Dowd & Jonathan Stroud, Standing to Appeal at the Federal Circuit: 
Appellants, Appellees, and Intervenors, 74 CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing Phigenix, 
Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (discussing recent standing cases.)). 
 51. Hydro Resources Inc. v U.S. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“As 
we have previously explained, ‘the out-of-pocket cost to a business of obeying a new rule of 
government[,] . . . (sic) whether or not [there may be] pecuniary loss’ associated with the new rule, 
suffices to establish an ‘injury in fact.’” (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Califrano, 622 F.2d 
1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1980)). 
 52. See Hydro, 608 F.3d at 1144–45.  
 53. Id. at 1170 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id.  
 55. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.  
concurring) (“Chevron . . . permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial 
and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to 
square with the Constitution”) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)). 
 56. Judge Gorsuch cited two concurring opinions by Justice Scalia in his reasoning as to why the 
Court should not apply any deference to the EPA. See Hydro, 608 F.3d at 1146 (citing Miss. Power & 
Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Crandon v. U.S., 
494 U.S. 152, 174 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
 57. Hydro, 608 F.3d at 1170 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134 (1944)).  
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“inappropriate” for the court to apply a legal theory not presented by one of the 
parties.58 Thus, the EPA’s regulation was successfully challenged. 
B. Russo v. Ballard Medical Products 
In Russo v. Ballard Medical Products,59 then-Judge Gorsuch demonstrated 
that he was at least familiar with patent law when he addressed a $20 million trade 
secret award case and issues of federal preclusion of state law claims—an 
argument he dismissed handily. In 2008, he upheld the award against a medical 
device company despite the company’s protest that it had patented the device and 
thus patent law preempted the state law trade secret claim on which the claim was 
based. In doing so, Judge Gorsuch defended a small inventor against a larger 
company, and found no problem with a $20 million award, effectively disregarding 
the defense counsel’s sophisticated ways of arguing the award should be limited.60 
However, in writing his opinion, Judge Gorsuch mainly ignored diving into 
questions of inventorship, ownership, and patentability.61 Instead, he spent the bulk 
of his opinion discussing the question of the Supremacy Clause’s relationship to 
state trade secret laws and federal patent laws. Ultimately, while he did concede 
that state protections can conflict with federal patent law,62 Judge Gorsuch felt no 
reason to involve federal law in a case involving only the two claims of 
misappropriation and breach of contract.63 
C. StorageCraft Technology Corporation v. Kirby 
Another trade secret case is notable in its elevation of formal legal harm over 
actual economic loss. It suggests that Justice Gorsuch may likely draw lines in 
favor of strict infringement liability and be less tethered than other justices to 
considerations of actual harm or consequences. In StorageCraft Technology 
 
 58. Hydro, 608 F.3d at 1146 n.10. The dissent does note that the court should at least consider 
applying Skidmore deference despite the EPA’s oversight, as a “party’s concession on the standard of 
review does not bind the court, as such a determination remains for the court to make for itself.” Id. at 
1170 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). The Majority was not convinced and does not 
address the issue above the line of the opinion. 
 59. Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 2008).  
 60. Id. at 1021 (“While perhaps a plausible position as a policy matter, the problem with Ballard’s 
argument is that the Utah legislature has rejected it . . . [a]pparently, it was the Utah legislature’s desire 
to ensure that misappropriators are not allowed to keep ill-gotten gains from their unlawful acts of 
misappropriations.”).  
 61. Id. at 1014 (“[N]o question of federal patent law was raised by Mr. Russo’s trial. He did not 
seek to be proclaimed the inventor of Ballard’s patents, or seek of the rights associated with 
inventorship”).  
 62. Id. at 1013 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).  
 63. See Russo, 550 F.3d at 1008.  
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Corporation v. Kirby,64 he upheld a $3 million award to a Utah company for a 
trade secret disclosure based entirely on spite–one that did not result in any actual 
loss.65 He found that “[w]hen someone steals a trade secret and discloses it to a 
competitor he effectively assumes for himself an unrestricted license in the trade 
secret. And that bears its costs.”66 
Judge Gorsuch apparently understands the questionable sensibility of such a 
strict interpretation of the law’s language.67 But in the end, he did not seem much 
troubled by harmful or perverse results of written law, shifting any blame for 
poorly written or unjust laws “to those charged with writing” them rather than 
“those charged with applying” them.68 This suggests to us he is unlikely to be 
swayed by parade-of-horrible arguments and likely prefers arguments couched in 
the text of the law before him divorced from much external context or 
consequence. 
D. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. 
Justice Gorsuch has also shown no great fear in tackling technology head-on, 
and has shown fluency in some of the more arcane details of that technology—as 
evidenced by his opinion in the copyright case, Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor 
Sales U.S.A., Inc.69  There, Judge Gorsuch found the computer-generated wire-
frame images of cars created for digital advertisements were not copyrightable, and 
expressed doubts as to the extent of what is copyrightable, finding that 
photographs, wire frames, and other artistic expressions “can be, but are not per se, 
copyrightable.” 70  This suggests he is unlikely to liberally apply the copyright 
doctrine to purely functional works and may look with skepticism on claims that 
products, without evidence of artistic expression, are copyrighted. 
Like his future dissent in Oil States, 71  Gorsuch spent quite some time 
discussing the history and purpose of intellectual property law. (It is perhaps not 
 
 64. StorageCraft Tech. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 65. Id. at 1185 (“The trouble is Utah’s law doesn’t distinguish between a misappropriator’s venial 
motives.”).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1187 (“We can imagine arguments that might lead [to] . . . worries that hypothetical 
royalty negotiation exercises themselves might be difficult to administer in certain circumstances or 
might yield damages in excess of the plaintiff’s actual losses.”).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).  
 70. Id. at 1269 (“[T]he Court indicated, photographs are copyrightable, if only to the extent of 
their original depiction of the subject. Wilde’s image is not copyrightable; but to the extent a 
photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions”). 
 71. See infra Sec. IV.A. 
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surprising that the self-proclaimed originalist and textualist72 would first cite the 
Constitution73 and then explore the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute74 in 
support of his analysis.) Starting there, he approached copyright in general, but not 
before laying the Constitutional groundwork many courts gloss over. 
In analyzing the opinion, Justice Gorsuch seems to recognize the particular 
difficulties in interpreting the nuances of intellectual property issues can be. 
Perhaps surprisingly, he shows some empathy towards Meshwerks, whose digital 
copies of Toyota’s cars he nonetheless held “insufficiently original to warrant 
copyright protection,”75 noting the “considerable amount of time, effort, and skill 
that went into making” 76  the models. If Meshwerks, Russo, and StorageCraft 
suggest anything to the patent lawyer consistent with what we will see from SAS 
and Oil States and his vision of the PTAB, it is that he seems to either side with, or 
at least recognize, the plight of the individual or the small plaintiff over the 
corporate, even when siding legally with the corporation. But with so few data 
points, that may be nothing more than idle speculation. Experience suggests the 
latter. 
But one insight to take from Meshwerks is in comparing it to the notable 
Supreme Court case Oil States77
 
discussed at length later. In Meshwerks, as in Oil 
States, Justice Gorsuch starts at the law’s source, tracing a line from the 
Constitution to the case at hand. He similarly discusses the intent and purpose of 
intellectual property law generally—that is, according to him.78 He then takes time 
to discuss briefly the opposing interpretation, 79 —if not a bit sarcastically. 80 
Reading either opinion as Gorsuch caring about the state of intellectual property 
law per se, however, misses the point. That approach is one he seems to adopt 
regardless of subject matter. Rather, Gorsuch the jurist seems occupied with two 
things—the law as it relates to the Constitution,81 and providing support for his 
opinions based on his reading of the statutory text. Interestingly, he seems to shy 
 
 72. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1262 (“This constitutional and statutory principle seeks to strike a 
delicate balance-reward”).  
 73. Id. at 1262 (“The Constitution authorizes Congress ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’”).  
 74. Id. at 1263 (“What exactly does it mean for a work to qualify as ‘original’?”). 
 75. Id. at 1269. 
 76. Id. at 1268. 
 77. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC., v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
 78. Id. at 1382 (“The Constitution itself reflects this new thinking”). 
 79. Id. at 1380 (“no doubt, dispensing with constitutionally prescribed procedures is often 
expedient”). 
 80. It seems he likes setting up straw men almost as much as he relishes knocking them down. It is 
a persuasive (if, to a dissenter, provocative) tactic.  
 81. Whether that be the Constitutionality of a statute or the roles of the separate branches.  
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away from heavy citation of the facts of any case, seeming much more comfortable 
discussing the law per se. 
E. Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp. 
He has, however, waded into areas of law that have been deeply debated by 
the patent community—a case about declaratory judgment standing after 
MedImmune, albeit in a trademark case. His approach there was to treat the issue—
declaratory judgment standing—as he would treat any other standing issue, citing 
the founding statutes and the relevant case to synthesize clear rules devoid of 
overcomplexity. 
In Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 82  Judge Gorsuch found declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction after MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech,83 where there was a 
broader business dispute between the two parties than what was before the court in 
the declaratory judgment action, including Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) challenges.
84
 Judge Gorsuch at least suggested that five TTAB 
oppositions and other administrative actions were enough to establish declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to challenge their validity in Federal Court, which is all the 
more notable given the growth and interest in standing to appeal from the PTAB, 
of which one of us has written. 85  Surefoot, particularly coupled with Hydro, 
suggests that Justice Gorsuch may have a preference for finding court standing 
rather than using it as a means of exercising judicial restraint. The outcome in 
Surefoot also suggests he might find standing to appeal where there is a broader 
dispute between the two parties at bar not directly related to the potential harm 
before him. 
To be sure, standing is a “squishy” doctrine, in the words of many 
practitioners.86 This particular preference is not expressly mentioned in the text of 
the opinion, and does not necessarily suggest how he might rule in another 
standing case where the Court might have other reasons for wanting (or not) to 
hear a particular case. So while we could read in a willingness to acknowledge the 
usefulness of TTAB proceedings and their administrative merit, we could equally 
see the argument that by finding the federal district court had standing that would 
 
 82. Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 83. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  
 84.  Surefoot LC, 531 F.3d at 1246–47. 
 85. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., Church Provides No Sanctuary: Sixth Circuit’s FDCPA Decision May Breathe New 
Life into TCPA Spokeo Arguments, CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. LEGAL UPDATE: BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://consumerfinancialserviceslaw.us/church-provides-no-sanctuary-sixth-circuits-fdcpa-decision-
may-breathe-new-life-into-tcpa-spokeo-arguments/ (“The result has been languid opinions and squishy 
legal doctrine in the arena of standing, where only precision and intellectual rigor ought to prevail.”).  
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control the outcome of those proceedings, he was expressing a preference for 
Federal adjudication over administrative.87 Perhaps the latter resonates more with 
his recent skepticism of the PTAB—and perhaps reflects early questioning as to 
why the Federal courts should defer to an administrative body in deciding what the 
law is or should be. 
IV. JUSTICE GORSUCH’S FIRST-TERM SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
Some might view Justice Gorsuch penning three patent opinions in his first 
year as a Supreme Court Justice demonstrating a newfound interest in and attention 
to patent law,88 an area in which he is (as demonstrated) not much experienced. 
Lobbyists and advocates hopeful for an ally on the bench have jumped to conclude 
Justice Gorsuch is everything from a patent protectionist89 to “a patent attorney’s 
hero”90 to a potential ally in the fight for 35 U.S.C. § 101 reform.91 
Not so (at least, not yet). We see no change in his rhetoric or focus from his 
time as a 10th Circuit judge to his time as Supreme Court Justice. Rather, after 
reading many of his opinions in detail, both below and at the high court, it does not 
appear that Justice Gorsuch has concerned himself much with patent law per se—
whether by choice or by chance. Instead, Justice Gorsuch appears most concerned 
about the administrative state, and what (we would imagine) he sees as the 
apparent weakening of judicial authority. It could be said, of course, that 
arguments tailored towards his strict constructionist and textualist views are more 
likely to hold sway; but any argument that expects him to come out on the side of 
one patent lobby or the other is unlikely to land, and misses the point—it is 
administrative law he is concerned with.  
 
 87. Surefoot LC, 531 F.3d at 1247 (“at least one commentator has suggested that the ‘real policy’ 
undergirding the case law cited by Sure Foot ND . . . has nothing to do with Article III but with a more 
practical concern ‘not to short-circuit the administrative tribunal that has already achieved jurisdiction 
over the issues’”).  
 88. See supra notes 2–3 and associated text.  
 89. Jenny Beth Martin, Justice Gorsuch Drives Home Patent Protection, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 6, 
2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/6/justice-neil-gorsuch-patent-protection/.  
 90. Gorsuch—A Patent Attorney’s Hero, MR. IP LAW: BLOG (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.mriplaw.com/blog/2018/4/24/gorsuch-a-patent-attorneys-hero. 
 91. See, e.g., Ben Brownlow, Patent Owner Impact: Justice Gorsuch’s Strict Adherence to 
Textualism, IP WIRE: BLOG (May 2, 2017), http://ipwire.com/stories/patent-owner-impact-gorsuchs-
adherence-strict-textualism/ (“The Alice/Mayo framework applied in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l is exactly the type of judicially-manufactured law that textualists 
like Gorsuch warn against. In his view, the judiciary was never meant to interpret the law without a 
basis or support in the underlying statute”).  
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A. Oil States v. Greene’s Energy92 (dissent) 
In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
finding that inter partes review does not violate the separation of powers principles 
of Article III or the Seventh Amendment.
93
 The dispute—whether issued patents 
are a “public right” or a “private right”—springs from a 2011 Chief Justice Roberts 
opinion that held that “Congress may not ‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.’”
94
 In that 
case, it held an administrative tribunal could not take from a common-law court a 
common-law counterclaim.   
Here, the 7–2 opinion in which the Court noted that it had previously 
recognized that “the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—
specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”
95
 Thus, the Court held that as “inter 
partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has 
permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration,” the 
PTO could reevaluate the patentability of claims without violating Article III.
96
 
The 7–2 majority opinion of the Court was written by Justice Thomas and joined 
by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan.   
Oil States was Justice Gorsuch’s first direct judicial foray into patent law, 
and, joined by Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, he adopted a surprisingly hard line, 
7–2, arguing that the Patent Offices’ longstanding use of post-grant proceedings 
(reissue, certificates of correction, and ex parte reexamination, among others) 
represented a retreat from judicial independence.97 Largely ignoring the nuanced 
running dispute between a Justice Breyer-led coalition advocating for a liberal 
interpretation of Stern v. Marshall,98  and a Chief Justice Roberts-led coalition 
calling for the opposite, Justice Gorsuch drew an surprisingly hard line, suggesting 
 
 92. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC., v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380–86 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
       93.  Id. at 1365. 
       94.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011). 
       95.  Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.  
       96. Id. 
       97. It is worth noting that scholars Adam Mossoff and Jonathan Barnett, among others, have for 
years maintained a hard line on the, shall we say, “judicial nature” of granted patents. Here Professor 
Mossoff was rewarded for his long and stalwart line of argument with multiple citations to some of his 
many meticulously researched law review articles on the subject. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1382 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001)). Whether you agree or disagree with Mr. Mossoff, 
credit him with earning Justice Gorsuch’s ear and acknowledgement.  
 98. Stern, 564 U.S. at 494. 
 
2019             ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT: JUSTICE GORSUCH’S PATENT  69 
 
that the McCormick case, 99  coupled with the Constitution, means the 
administration cannot and should not revoke any granted patent rights.100  
The majority, authored by Justice Thomas, cited a long list of cases, law, and 
statutory schema.
101
 It took pains to distinguish McCormick and its ilk, noting that 
they “sought only to interpret statutes then in force,” namely, the 1870 Patent 
Act.102 Justice Gorsuch retorted: “this much is hard to see.”103 Justice Gorsuch 
cited Justice Thomas’ words in a 2015 dissent against him, signaling that even 
those on the court he is most closely aligned with ideologically will not escape his 
hard line. 
He notes that the “decision may not represent a rout,” but argued that “it at 
least signals a retreat from Article III’s guarantees,” and while it “may seem like 
an act of judicial restraint,” rather, “enforcing Article III isn’t about protecting 
judicial authority for its own sake.”104 In this, we see his voice emerge—a Justice, 
in his opinion, must actively rule where they might otherwise demur to prevent 
what he sees as a broader erosion of judicial independence. 
His approach is clear. For Justice Gorsuch, when it comes to threats of 
judicial erosion or what he sees as administrative overreach, it can be characterized 
superlatively as “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead.”105 While Gorsuch spends 
a few pages here discussing the purpose, history, and practice of patent law for the 
first time, it is not patents or patent law per se that he cares about—at least, up 
until now. Rather, it is his fear that the courts are giving up its judicial authority “in 
the name of efficient” governing.106 His final line sums up the obvious inference: 
“Hamilton warned the judiciary to take ‘all possible care . . . to defend itself 
against’ intrusions by the other branches.”107 
 
 99. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898).  
 100. One can sense, and could sense at oral argument, that the Chief Justice was disappointed in 
missing the opportunity to cement his Stern plurality here. Stern, 564 U.S. at 468–504. Indeed, the 
Breyer concurrence and the Thomas majority both note it, with the majority dodging it and the 
concurrence seeking to distinguish the case (and hence weaken it), and the dissent largely ignoring it. 
See generally Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 101. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1370–75 (citing United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 
(1888); McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609; and Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1856)). 
 102. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 1386. 
 105. To popularly (mis)paraphrase Admiral David Farragut at the Battle of Mobile Bay (“Damn the 
torpedoes! Four bells. Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!”). 
 106. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1386 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
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B. SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu108 (majority) 
We might call SAS “Gorsuch’s revenge;” we might equally think of it a 
consolation prize, a 5–4 compromise opinion, or a plain-language statutory 
construction case; or we might see it as the moderating of tone that occurs when 
one goes from slim dissent to bare majority. The 5–4 opinion took a relatively 
straightforward statutory interpretation of the AIA and, disregarding the argued 
consequences thereof, adopted instead a plain facial reading of the statute, finding 
the agency’s interpretation contrary to that plain meaning. 
In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch sidestepped Chevron deference as 
unnecessary to the analysis,109 but nonetheless took some shots at it along the way. 
He also took some shots at the Justice Thomas-authored majority opinion in Oil 
States110—issued on the same day. Note that, in majority, Justice Gorsuch’s view 
of the IPR and the post-grant review process is much more balanced, nuanced, and 
even conciliatory. This shift suggests that either separate clerks wrote the opinions, 
or (much more likely), Justice Gorsuch had a freer hand in penning his dissent 
(nonbinding and joined by only one other) than he did in a bare majority opinion 
joined by fellow Justices Thomas, Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy. 
He notes here that, despite the USPTO’s patent examination process: 
 
Sometimes . . . bad patents slip through. Maybe the invention was 
not novel, or maybe it was obvious all along, and the patent owner 
should not enjoy the special privileges it has received. To remedy 
these sorts of problems, Congress has long permitted parties to 
challenge the validity of patent claims in federal court. More 
recently, Congress has supplemented litigation with various 
administrative remedies. The first of these was ex parte 
reexamination.111 
 
Justice Gorsuch adopted an interesting new taxonomy for post-grant 
challenges, calling ex parte review “inquisitorial,” comparing the IPR process to 
civil litigation, and suggesting the IPR process could be used to circumnavigate the 
courts, and dismissing some of the more complex arguments by the Government. 
In dismissing arguments otherwise, he notes, “We just don’t see it.”112 In dicta he 
suggests Chevron may not have continued vitality, “[b]ut whether Chevron should 
 
 108. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 109. Id. at 1358 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  
 110. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1365. 
 111. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353. 
 112. Id. at 1357 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837). 
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remain is a question we may leave for another day,” as it need not be invoked for 
this opinion.113 
Other than the various practical consequences he ignores and the exegesis 
involved in his divining of the Congressional intent behind the statutory 
language,114 his reading is textual and straightforward. As his lower-court opinions 
reveal, he would rather the answer be straightforward than left to another’s case-
by-case discretion, particularly where the other does not wear robes. We would 
have preferred judicial restraint here, whether liberal or conservative. It will be 
fascinating to watch this Court develop. 
The liberal justices, for their part, variously call his reading of the statute 
“wooden,” and conjure a parade of horribles. As to those horribles, color us 
skeptical—this is at most a somewhat obtuse procedural change, and should do 
little to affect outcomes, though it may make administration of some challenges 
more difficult.  But as noted,115 the consequences of the Court’s opinions are not 
the point for Gorsuch. His textualist views dominate his opinion. It is not that he is 
ignoring the complexity and nuance of the reasons behind certain laws, rather, he 
often seems unconvinced it should matter. 
C. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.116 (dissent) 
Extraterritoriality makes strange bedfellows. In WesternGeco, we see Justice 
Gorsuch join Justice Breyer in dissent, again against Justice Thomas. 
In dissent, he finds that “A U.S. patent provides a lawful monopoly over the 
manufacture, use, and sale of an invention within this country only.”117 He finds 
that this reading presupposes that U.S. patent owners can charge rents for their 
patents that are infringed on foreign soil, and argues this conflicts with the plain 
language of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1) and 271(a). He argues that, the “same acts 
outside the United States do not infringe a U.S. patent right.”118 Asking “[w]hat’s 
the upshot for our case?,” he finds that “a U.S. patent does not protect its owner 
 
 113. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837). 
 114. One of the authors has spoken with many of those who participated in the debates and drafting 
of the bill, and they assure him that they simply did not think about whether institutions would be 
partial or otherwise. In our mind, both are possible interpretations to be implemented and neither is 
more or less inherently unfair. Both interpretations have their advantages and drawbacks. We think on 
some level Justice Gorsuch agrees, and this is more about the agency replacing its own judgment for 
what he sees is the statutes’ judgment. In one respect, Justice Gorsuch is blending right in with his 
Supreme colleagues—his skepticism of patent specialists is likely to resonate with the rest of the Court.  
 115. See supra note 67 for further discussion on this point. 
 116. 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
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from competition beyond our borders,” 119  despite the harm from overseas 
competition. He engages in a parade of horribles, suggesting that our U.S. patent 
laws cannot extend beyond our border, for components or otherwise. The dissent 
can be summed up as endorsing a limited view of patent monopolies: 
 
By failing to heed the plain text of the Patent Act and the lessons of 
our precedents, the Court ends up assuming that patent damages run 
(literally) to the ends of the earth. It allows U.S. patent owners to 
extend their patent monopolies far beyond anything Congress has 
authorized and shields them from foreign competition U.S. patents 
were never meant to reach.120 
D. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v Lundgren121 (majority) 
Finally, a largely unnoticed late-term Gorsuch majority opinion on tribal 
sovereign immunity, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe merits mention for its potential 
effect on recent PTAB decisions.
 
In this case, a Native American tribe surveyed 
land purchased from the U.S. government (in attempting to, but having not yet 
reintegrated it into their reservation), and found an adjacent landowner’s fence 
included 1,300 feet of fence that was over their property line, and sought to remove 
the landowner; the landowner preemptively brought a quiet title action in U.S. 
court; the tribe invoked sovereign immunity to dismiss the suit. 122  The case 
centered in part on whether in rem (versus in personam) suits are immune from 
sovereign immunity. 
The case is important for both the PTAB and patent law, as Native American 
tribes and state universities have been claiming sovereign immunity exempts them 
from the IPR process, most notably and unsuccessfully in Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.123  One of the arguments the Board judges made 
(albeit in concurrence) in finding that principles of Native American sovereign 
immunity did not apply was that because PTAB proceedings are in rem, sovereign 
immunity did not apply.124 
 
 119. Id. at 2140. 
 120. Id. at 2143–44. 
 121. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018). 
 122. Nearly a century ago, one of the author’s (we’ll leave it to the reader to imagine which one) 
Arkansan great-grandfather initiated an action in trespass against an adjacent landowner for a similar 
offense, which seems to be a fairly common dispute in the American heartland.  
 123. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. IPR2016-01127, Papers 129, 130 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), aff’d, 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (request for en banc review pending as 
of this writing).  
 124. APJ Bisk and APJ Harlow wrote thus their identical concurrences at the PTAB in the 
University of Minnesota immunity Board decisions. See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 
No. IPR2017-01068, Paper 18 at 11, Paper 19 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (Harlow, APJ, 
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Justice Gorsuch, writing for the 7–2 majority and joined by the liberal 
justices, noted that the fee-patented lands of Native American land were not 
wholly exempt based in in rem jurisdiction, throwing into doubt what APJ Bisk 
and APJ Harlow argued.125 In doing so, Justice Gorsuch ran afoul of what Justice 
Thomas called “hornbook law” on an alternative common-law exception—that 
immovable property is, and has been for centuries, immune from sovereign 
immunity.126 That is, if the immovable property is on the land of the sovereign, the 
sovereign always has jurisdiction. 
The case has obvious implications for PTAB tribal sovereign immunity. If 
Justice Gorsuch feels strongly that a more liberal application of sovereign 
immunity might be appropriately applied to patent law, the recent decision made 
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit could be under threat,127 in that the 
inevitable petition for certiorari in St. Regis or one of the follow-on challenges 
related to sovereign immunity may catch his eye and receive a favorable vote to 
grant certiorari and an eventual hearing in conference; he certainly, after Skagit, 
will not be finding that the PTAB proceedings, as in rem, wholly avoid questions 
of sovereign immunity. That is all the more true after his recent hiring and 
installing of the first Supreme Court law clerk of Native American descent, Tobi 




“Uncompromising men are easy to admire. He has courage, so does a dog. But it 
is exactly the ability to compromise that makes a man noble.”129 
After a careful reading of Justice Gorsuch’s intellectual property opinions, 
we find no indication Justice Gorsuch had any strong interest in patents or patent 
law when he came to the Court. In his first year as a Supreme Court Justice, it 
 
concurring); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 13 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (Bisk, APJ, concurring). 
 125. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. at 1653. APJ Bisk and APJ Harlow published identical 
concurring opinions in two separate IPR proceedings. See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 
No. IPR2017-01068 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (Harlow, APJ, concurring), Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (Bisk, APJ, concurring); see also St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), St. Regis 
Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 2018-1638 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2018).  
 126. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. at 1657 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 127. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
   128. See Press Release, Chicksaw Nation Media Relations Office, Chicksaw Woman Selected To 
Clerk For Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch (Apr. 13, 2018), https://chickasaw.net/News/Press-
Releases/Release/Chickasaw-woman-selected-to-clerk-for-Supreme-Cour-47329.aspx.  
 129. BRAVEHEART (20th Century Fox Home Entertainment 1995) (lines spoken by the leper 
Edward Bruce about the film’s Catholic hero, Sir William Wallace). 
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appears Justice Gorsuch penned his patent opinions in part because he found the 
patent cases some of the low-hanging fruit related to administrative law issues that 
have long concerned him. Rather, we find two consistent strains throughout his 
writings: one, a healthy skepticism for any Congressional or judicial interpretation 
beyond the plain language of the governing statute; and two, skepticism for any 
argument suggesting an administrative body may be better equipped to adjudicate 
a legal issue. In that respect, we admire his clarity of purpose. 
We do worry, however, about any judge or justice who can so easily ignore 
the real-world consequences of their seemingly academic decisions.130  But we 
suppose the inevitable tension between descriptivists and prescriptivists in English 
usage extends to judicial philosophy and, indeed, most fields—and boils down to a 
disagreement between hard rules versus adaptable standards, and–as a corollary–a 
disagreement between the respective metes and bounds between the Branches of 
Government. 
In that way, Justice Gorsuch is consistent with Judge Gorsuch. During his 
tenure on the 10th Circuit, Judge Gorsuch did not have the opportunity to 
adjudicate many patent issues. This does not affect our opinion. Patents seem to 
have been, at least at first, a secondary concern for Justice Gorsuch. But it is a 
useful vehicle for him to address other concerns.
131
 We have already addressed 
how much his new opinions can mirror his old concerns. We have noted his 
wariness of administrative deference, in both Chevron and Skidmore we have 
noted his tendency towards simple interpretations of the law, consequences be 
damned; and we have noted his summarily dismissing arguments that might 
threaten judicial authority. Justice Gorsuch will form his own opinions about the 
language before him, sometimes despite the precedence, and he will make those 
opinions clear. 
 
 130. To be fair, it should be noted that Judge Gorsuch has cited policy discussions in some of his 
opinions discussed here. See, e.g., Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 1004, 1021 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Such policy discussions, however, are most commonly used as a straw man to seemingly soften his 
rebuke of an interpretation or opinion he does not agree with. See, e.g., id. at 1021 (“We cannot agree”). 
Or to berate poorly written laws. See, e.g., id. at 1021 (“While perhaps a plausible position as a policy 
matter, the problem with Ballard’s argument is that the Utah legislature has rejected it.”).  
131. Compare Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1229 (last visited Dec 31, 2018)  (deciding whether “on-sale” 
under AIA law includes secret sales) with Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-712 (last visited Dec 31, 2018) (deciding whether an 
administrative law process can deprive patent holders of their property rights without providing them a 
jury and an Article III forum) and SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-969 (last visited Dec 31, 2018). It should be noted that the case in 
Helsinn Healthcare rests solely on the statutory interpretation of the language in the AIA and is 
unlikely to have any effect on Administrative law, thus it did not surprise the Authors of this paper that 
J. Gorsuch chose to interject only once during the oral arguments, on a question regarding the Office’s 
interpretation of the language. This is in stark contrast to the forty-one and twenty-eight times he spoke 
up during the Oil States and SAS oral arguments respectively.  
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In that respect, we point readers to the 8–1 Sveen v. Melin,132 a seemingly 
easy Supreme Court case where Justice Gorsuch was the lone dissenter. In it, 100 
years of precedent on the Contracts Clause seemingly controlled. Justice Gorsuch, 
for his part, was not swayed by the opinions of precedent, nor was he swayed by 
practicality or nuance. We leave it up to readers to decide if that is judicial 
activism, judicial restraint, radical originalism, or something new we have not yet 
seen in the Court. 
However, after a year of opinions, we now know more about where Justice 
Gorsuch stands on that spectrum. We are largely hopeful that the Justice and his 
colleagues will continue to strive for the right decisions (on patents, at least) for 
our polity, while engaging in a healthy respect for our rule of law. After all, “shall 
not the judge of all the earth do right?”133 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thus, we return to and reform our initial thesis. Justice Gorsuch has, in fact, 
cared about patents in his first term, but only because patent law happens to be a 
useful springboard to addressing his greater concerns regarding administrative law 
and judicial authority. Put another way, any argument about patents, patent law, or 
the role of the Patent Office made before Justice Gorsuch not addressing the role of 
the judiciary versus the administrative state was unlikely to hold sway, and may 
have been summarily dismissed in his opinions. It was in appealing to his hostility 
to longstanding principles of administrative law that one could find a receptive ear, 
and pen. Now, with the hiring of clerks specializing in patent law and with a 
growing body of experience ruling on issues before him at the high Court, Justice 
Gorsuch seems to be betraying a desire to “learn fast” the issues undergirding 
some of the patent law disputes he confronted in his first term. So whether he was 
interested in patents might be a moot point today; but the fact that he is now 
seemingly concerned with patent law is best informed as being sparked by, rooted 
in, ongoing administrative law concerns.  
 
 132. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018).  
 133. Genesis 18:25 (King James); see also ALAN MOORE, WATCHMEN CHAPTER III: THE JUDGE OF 
ALL THE EARTH (1985).  
